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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KUNZ 8c COMPANY, dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a
California corporation,
Case No. 970216-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 15

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has original appellate
jurisdiction over this appeal from the declaratory judgment of
the Fifth District Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) .

This Court has jurisdiction resulting from the

Supreme Court's pour-over of the case to the Court of Appeals
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996) .

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court erred in basing its judgment

on a supposed fact irrelevant to whether the area was zoned for
the purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and which, in any
event, does not exist.
2.

Whether, in view of the district court's clearly

erroneous finding, this Court should declare the area Kunz
proposes for signs ineligible for signs on the basis of law in
effect at the time of the trial upon the second remand.
3.

Whether the district court erred in failing to consider

specific factors the Court of Appeals directed it to consider,
and other relevant factors, in determining whether the property
is zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
4.

Whether the district court erred in disregarding as

unworkable Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) after the Court
of Appeals had identified that subsection as controlling and
directed the trial court to follow it.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1 is a question of adequacy of the trial court's

2

findings, reversible for clear error.

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d

996, 999 (Utah 1987) (findings must show that court's judgment
follows logically from and is supported by evidence).

(R. 769.)

Issue No. 2 is a question of law or correct application
of law, and is reviewable without deference to the district
court's determination. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park
Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).

(R. 705-16.)

Issue No. 3 is, as to factors the Court of Appeals
specifically directed the District Court to consider, a question
of law and is reviewable without deference to the district court.
Slatterv v. Covey & Co.. Inc..909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995). (R.
861, 874, 875, 878, 924, 978, 981, 985, 986, 987.)

As to other

relevant factors, the issue is one of adequacy of the trial
court's factual findings, which are reversible where clearly
erroneous.

Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d at 999. (R. 1043, 855-56,

876, 882-83, 902, 947.)
Issue No. 4 is a question of law or correct application of
law and is reviewable for correctness.

Slattery v. Covey & Co. ,

Inc., 909 P.2d at 925; United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park

3

City Co.. 870 P.2d at 885.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following authorities are believed by Appellant to be
determinative of certain issues presented in this appeal and are
supplied in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.2(1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995)
Utah-Federal Agreement (incorporated by reference in
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.2)
Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-1(1994)
Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-3(4) (1994)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW
This is a declaratory judgment action on remand concerning

pristine and scenic land adjacent to 1-15 in the town of
Toquerville, Washington County, Utah.

The fundamental question

is whether it is unlawful to place outdoor advertising billboards
on this land.1

The background for this case is essentially

Addendum B hereto consists of copies of four photographs
that were UDOT's Exhibits 8, 11, 12, and 13. The photographs
4

provided in the Utah Court of Appeal's recitation in its decision
on the prior appeal reported in Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913
P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996) (attached hereto as Addendum C for
reference).

Included in the Court of Appeal's introductory

statement is the following:

M

[I]n November of [1993], the town

of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's property and chose to retain the
'highway commercial' zoning for the area.

However, there is not

now, nor has there ever been, any commercial development on the
property other than the three billboards."

Lei. at 767.

Three large billboards had been erected on the property
prior to the Toquerville annexation by a predecessor sign company
to Kunz.

(R. 198, 593-94, 645.)

The Court of Appeals held the

signs "illegal and subject to removal because Kunz [had] not
obtained valid permits for the signs."

id. at 770.

Still, the

appellate court remanded a second time to the Fifth District
Court, to determine whether, in view of the stated purpose of the

show the view of the area of the signs from the eastern lane of
the divided highway of 1-15 looking west with the sign posts
visible (Exhibit 8) and a closer view of the area of each of the
three sign posts. (Exhibits 11, 12, and 13).
5

Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to preserve "natural scenic beauty
of the lands bordering on the highways," the land was "zoned for
the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising" as
prohibited by the Act, and for that reason ineligible as a
location for billboards.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-136.2 and

27-12-136.3(3)(1995).
The district court ruled the land was not "zoned for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising," basing its
decision on the existence of conditional use permits for the
signs.

(R. 769 -- Fifth District Court Findings of Fact,

Addendum C, HU 9 and 10.)

There was, however, no evidence of the

issuance of any conditional use permit for any of the signs.
The Court of Appeals had specifically directed the district
court to consider "evidence of actual land use or any evidence
that the zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning
designation."

Xd. at 769.

And the district court did find that

the "only use of the . . . property since [erection of the signs]
in 1987 has been for outdoor advertising signage." (R. 768 -Fifth District Court Findings of Fact, Addendum D, %% 3 and 4 ) .

6

However, the court disregarded that finding as irrelevant to its
resolution of the case.

Further, the district court entered no

finding at all on perpetuation of the prior zoning designation,
despite the existence of evidence thereon.

The district court

then entered a declaratory judgment that the area was not zoned
for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and hence
signs in that area would not be unlawful.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The factual background of the case prior to the district

court bench trial on October 1, 1996 is provided by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Kunz & Company v. State of Utah. 913 P.2d
765.

Consistent therewith, and supplementing with material based

on the trial and subsequent court-issued documents, this further
factual statement is provided.
Until the sign faces were removed under Court order in 1996,
the outdoor advertising signs now owned by Appellee Kunz stood
for over eight years on land adjacent to 1-15 in Washington
County.

Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah. 913 P.2d 765.

There has

never been any commercial activity on the land other than the

7

signs.

(R. 768 -- Fifth District Court Findings of Fact,

Addendum D, HH 3 and 4; R. 861 11 11-15, R. 874 11 14-25 and R.

;

875 11 1-22, R. 878 1 25 and R. 879 1 22, R. 923 11 18-25 and R.
924 11 1-19, R. 978 11 24-25 through R. 981 1 1, R. 985 11 21-25,
R. 986 11 1-25, and R. 987 11 1-10.)

The issue at the trial on

remand was whether Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) and related
law barred re-erection of billboards on that land.
Tracking the zoning and annexation of the land, in 198 9,
Washington County changed the zoning from "agricultural" to
"highway commercial" at the urging of the landowner (Eveleth).
(R. 198-199, 222-245, 253, 592, 594.)

Later, the Toquerville

Town Council annexed the land in question and perpetuated the
same "highway commercial" zoning classification of the property
that it had while its status was part of the unincorporated area
of the county.

(R. 595; Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913 P.2d at

767; R. 985 11 9-21, R. 989 11 4-13, R. 990 11 20-24.)

As noted,

it was also at the request of Eveleth, the owner of the land on
which the signs stood and would stand, and who was the lessor of
the land to the sign company, that the land was annexed by

8

Toquerville. (R. 855 11 24-25 and R. 856 11 1-9, R. 876 11 1-25
and R. 877 11 1-12, R. 882 11 16-25 and R. 883 1 1.)
On August 7, 1989, the Utah Department of Transportation,
District Five held a sign hearing regarding the three signs
pursuant to UDOT's notice of violation.

(R. 247-251, 594.)

UDOT

entered an order dated August 25, 1989 ruling the three signs
unlawful.
order.

The then sign owner (Lundgren) appealed the UDOT

(R. 199, 594.)

It was during the pendency of the Appeal

that the zoning of the property in question was changed to
"highway commercial" by Washington County, and upon being
informed of this fact by UDOT, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded
to the agency for consideration of the rezoning and its effect,
if any.

(R. 199, 200, 253, 594.)

On February 25, 1993, UDOT entered its "Order on Remand
Revoking Permits and for Removal of Signs."

On January 18, 1994,

Kunz made application for renewal permits for the signs, which
application UDOT denied.

(R. 595.)

On February 16, 1994, Kunz

filed an action in the Fifth District Court for a declaratory
judgment regarding its alleged right to sign permits.
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(R. 595.)

Kunz did not, however, seek a UDOT administrative hearing.

Kunz

and UDOT filed cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court granting Kunz's motion for summary judgment and denying the
motion of UDOT.

(R. 600-02.)

UDOT appealed.

On March 14, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the signs were "illegal" (913 P.2d at
770), but directing the trial court to conduct inquiry into the
purpose of the zoning in light of the essential purposes of the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, including inquiry regarding
"evidence of actual land use."

(i£l. at 769.)

On October 1, 1996, the Fifth District Court conducted a
bench trial pursuant to the remand, after which it entered
judgment in favor of Appellee Kunz.

(Addendum E.)

The trial

proceeding and court-issued documents established the following
facts:
1. The district court based its decision on the existence of
Toquerville conditional use permits for the signs, the court
stating as follows:
Due to the fact that placement of outdoor advertising
signs within the Eveleth property . . . could only be
10

done by conditional use permit, the Court cannot find
that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow
outdoor advertising signage.
(R. 769.)

However, no evidence was submitted that conditional

use permits were obtained.

In fact, the Toquerville ordinance

limited "highway commercial" signs under the conditional use
permit process to a maximum size of eight feet by twelve feet
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) , and each of the proposed Kunz signs is
14 feet by 48 feet.
2.

(R. 664-66)

The land adjacent to the highway on which Kunz wishes to

place the three billboards is natural and scenic, has never had
any commercial use, other than the signs, and has no utilities to
service commercial usage.
evidence.

This is shown by photos admitted in

(Defendant's Exhibits 5-13) and comment thereon at R.

1003-04, 1027-28.)

It is also evidenced by unrebutted testimony,

of which the following is typical:

U

Q: At the time of the

annexation, there was no culinary water or sewer to the area
where the signs are; is that correct?
874 11 14-16; see also R. 924 11 1-19);

A: That is correct."

(R.

"Q: Without water and

sewer up there, commercial development is not feasible; is that

11

correct?

A: That's correct.

There would have to be utilities

available for a commercial development."

(R. 875 11 2-5.))

It was stipulated that the following description of the land
given by the court was accurate:
[I]f one were to stand on the 1-15 freeway near the
area of the signs and look west and northwest, you
would see basically sage and pinion foliage extending
for some miles uninterrupted by presence of human
activity at all.
As a backdrop to that sage and pinion foliage, you
have the western face -- no, take that back -- eastern
face of the Pine Valley Mountains, which constitutes
the horizon west and northwest of the area of the
signs, and that it is with the exception of the
freeway, itself, in that location without any other
indication of human activity.
(R. 879 11 14-25. )
After testifying that he had lived in the area for more than
30 years and had gone by the area "all the time.

Almost daily"

(R. 979 1 12), former Toquerville Mayor Charles Wahlquist
responded to questions as follows:
Q. Have you ever seen any commercial activity in the
area right where the signs are other than the signs?
A. No.
Q. Has there ever been any culinary water service run
up to the area where the signs are?
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Q. Has there ever been any sewer service run to that
12

area where the signs are?
A. No. There's no sewage up there at all. We had
talked with the sewer district to get some, but there
isn't any present.
Q. Without culinary water or sewage, commercial
development in that area cannot reasonably be done;
isn't that correct?
A.

Correct.

Also, the distance from the closest of the three signs to
the intersection with 1-15 is approximately 2000 feet.
11 2-5.)

(R. 1024

If any commercial development were to occur in the

area, it would first be placed right at the intersection (R. 923
11 19-25, R. 924 11 1-3, R. 959 11 9-24), and no commercial
development has occurred even there.
3.

(Id.)

The district court ruled inadmissible as irrelevant,

proffered testimony of Toquerville's own zoning expert, that
"based on the standards of zoners[,] taking into account the
nature of the pristine area with its beauty where the signs are
[,]

. . . h e would not recommend that outdoor advertising signs

be placed there, that he would recommend that they not be placed
there."

(R. 999 11 13-19. ) 2

The trial court did, however,

2

The testimony was offered to show that signs at this
location would violate the stated purpose of the act to promote
13

receive without objection testimony that the zoning expert and
his colleagues "wanted to retain a more natural looking corridor
entering into the St. George basin" (R. 934 11 24-25, R. 935 1
1), but assumed since the three signs were already erected "that
we might have to live with" them.

(R. 935 11 3-4.)

And it did

receive without objection testimony from one of Kunz's witnesses
that a gentleman interested in developing the land in the general
area "was very adamant about not having those signs there"
because "he thought that would be an eyesore and that it should
be left in its natural pristine condition."

(R. 878 11 13-14,

22-24. )
4.

Toquerville's first interest in the annexing and zoning

of the land was "tax revenue of the Town of Toquerville."
947, 11 13-17.
11

See also R. 367, 11 9-11

(R.

(of three issues, number

[o] ne is always to do with money, who pays what taxes in the

the "enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment
in such highways, [and] to preserve the natural scenic beauty of
lands bordering on [the] highways" (Utah Code Ann. § 27-12136.2), in light of which § 27-12-136.3(3) must be read, under
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.

14

county versus the city"); R. 902 11 8-11 (referring to "the
potential tax base benefits that commercial development at the
interchange would bring to the Toquerville Town").)

The only

commercial activity on the property annexed at the request of
Eveleth, the lessor of the land to the sign company, that has
ever existed to pay taxes to Toquerville is billboards Kunz now
seeks to reerect.
5.

The district court disregarded as unworkable the Code

section the Utah Court of Appeals had identified as controlling
and directed the District Court to follow.

The district court

stated as follows:
I observe parenthetically that the legislative use
within 27-12-136.3 sub 3 of the phrase primary purpose
of allowing outdoor advertising probably does not
accomplish the intent -- the announced intent of the
act or give any kind of reasonable framework within
which courts may determine issues of these kinds.
I would suspect that it would be a rare case if
the Court could find evidence that the primary purpose
was to build billboards.
(R. 1068 11 1-5.)
Thereupon the district court granted declaratory judgment in
favor of Kunz.

(Addendum E -- Order.)

15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erroneously based its judgment on a supposed
fact irrelevant to whether the area is zoned for the primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and which, in any event,
does not exist. Though the district court relied on the supposed
issuance of Toquerville conditional use permits for the signs, no
evidence of the issuance of conditional use permits was
submitted, and the Toquerville ordinance limits signs to a size
far smaller than Kunz's proposed billboards.
The signs Kunz proposes to erect would be unlawful because
they cannot meet current requirements for valid permits,
including compliance with State and federal statutes, UDOT rules
and the Toquerville ordinance limiting signs to 8 feet by 12
feet.
The Utah Court of Appeals directed the district court to
consider certain specific factors and other evidence as to
whether the billboards would be in an area "zoned for the primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising."

These factors included

"actual land use" and whether the zoning body perpetuated the
prior zoning designation of Washington County that the Court of
16

Appeals had ruled failed to justify the area for billboards under
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3).

The district court, however,

failed to consider any such factors, disregarding the
overwhelming evidence that the land was natural, beautiful and
scenic without any commercial incidents absent the signs and
rendering no finding on any other such evidence.
The lower court went so far as to describe the controlling
section of law the Court of Appeals had discussed and directed
the lower court to apply, as essentially unworkable.

The

district court's errors require this Court to vacate the lower
court judgment and hold that the area in question is ineligible
for outdoor advertising signs.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A
SUPPOSED FACT IRRELEVANT TO WHETHER THE AREA WAS ZONED FOR
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF ALLOWING OUTDOOR ADVERTISING AND
WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DOES NOT EXIST
As noted above, the district court found as follows:
Due to the fact that placement of outdoor advertising
signs within the Eveleth property . . . could only be
done by conditional use permit, the Court cannot find

17

that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow
outdoor advertising signage.
(R. 769.)
This supposed fact, however, has nothing to do with the
question whether the area was zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising.

Further, Kunz tendered no evidence

to show that Toquerville had issued conditional use permits for
the signs.

Indeed, the Toquerville ordinance limits "highway

commercial" signs under the conditional use permit process to a
maximum size of 8 feet by 12 feet (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) , and
each of the proposed Kunz signs is 14 feet by 48 feet.

(R. 664-

66. )
Thus, the trial court's judgment is fatally flawed on the
ground that the court's findings do not show that the court's
judgment follows logically from and is supported by evidence.
See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d at 999.

The district court

judgment is erroneous and should be reversed.

18

II.

SINCE THE SIGNS WERE DECLARED *ILLEGAL" BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR HAVING NO VALID PERMITS AND SINCE THE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT BASED ON CONDITIONAL USE
PERMITS IS ERRONEOUS, THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY DECLARE
THE AREA PROPOSED FOR THE SIGNS AS INELIGIBLE FOR
SIGNS ON THE BASIS OF LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE
TRIAL UPON SECOND REMAND
The Utah Court of Appeals declared the signs on the land in

issue "illegal and subject to removal" because Kunz had not
obtained valid permits for the signs.
Utah, 913 at 770.

Kunz & Co. v. State of

That decision was not appealed.

Pursuant to

that decision, and after Kunz;s motion for injunctive relief to
prevent removal of the signs was denied by the District Court (R.
615-68.), the sign faces were removed.3
Since after the Court of Appeals declared the signs
"illegal" Kunz had no vested rights to signs at the disputed
location, Kunz would thereafter have to comply with all existing
statutes and rules to qualify the three proposed signs for UDOT
sign permits.

Also, the district court's declaratory judgment on

the second remand based on the supposed existence of Toquerville

3

Though UDOT could have required removal of the entire sign
structures, as a courtesy to Kunz, UDOT allowed Kunz to remove
the sign faces only, until final resolution.
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conditional use permits was erroneous inasmuch as no evidence was
submitted to show that conditional use permits even existed.
Thus, this court can write on a clean slate and finally end this
odyssey without further remand by declaring the area unlawful for
signs on the basis of a clarifying rule in effect at the time of,
and urged at, the trial.

(R. 708-09.)

That rule is R933-2-3(4)(1994) of the Utah Administrative
Code.

The rule clarifies the definition in Utah Code Ann. § 27-

12-136.3(3) (1995) that was otherwise considered ambiguous, in
the following language:
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of
outdoor advertising" as used in subsection 27-12136.3(3) of the Act is defined to include areas in
which the primary activity is outdoor advertising.
"It is the settled rule that the practical interpretation of
an ambiguous or doubtful statute that has been acted upon by
officials charged with its administration will not be disturbed
except for weighty reasons."

Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336

(1930) (upholding a challenged federal regulation).

See also

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6(1995)(granting to UDOT the power to
make rules).

Thus, the area in question is unlawful for signs
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inasmuch as it is undisputed that the area is. one "in which the
primary [only] activity is outdoor advertising."

Utah

Administrative Code R933-2-3(4) (1994).
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
SPECIFIC FACTORS THE COURT OF APPEALS DIRECTED IT TO
CONSIDER AND OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING
WHETHER THE PROPERTY IS ZONED FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE
OF ALLOWING OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
The district court's failure to follow this Court's
instruction to consider certain factors violates the legal
principle of law of the case.

The principle is stated in

Slattery v. Covey & Co. Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1995),
as follows:
[A] ny definitive ruling by an appellate court becomes
the "law of the case, and the trial court is bound to
follow it, even though it considers the ruling
erroneous." fStreet v. Fourth Judicial District Court.
113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948).] The Utah
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle.
In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah
1995), the court stated that "pronouncements of an
appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of
the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings
. . . the lower court must implement both the letter
and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the
appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it
embraces." I&. at 1037-38 (citations omitted). . . .
The relevant factors the lower court failed to consider will
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be discussed individually.
A.

Failure to Consider Actual Land Use, i.e., No Commercial
Incidents and the Natural, Scenic Beauty of the Lands
Bordering the Highway (Absent the Signs)

If this Court considers it necessary to go beyond the
district court's error coupled with R933-2-3(4) as a basis on
which to determine the area is ineligible for signs, the Court
should reverse based on the district court's failure to consider
factors the Utah Court of Appeals directed it to consider.

The

Court of Appeals recognized the limitations of subjective
statements of intent as to whether or not, under subsection 2712-136.3(3), an area was zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising.

It therefore directed the district

court to consider "not just the stated purpose of the zoning or
local government," but all "relevant evidence" including
"evidence of actual land use or any evidence that the zoning body
merely perpetuated a prior zoning designation."

Kunz & Co. v.

State of Utah, 913 P.2d 769.
Thus, the first and most important objective element the
Court of Appeals directed the district court to consider was
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"actual land use."

Id.

The reason for focusing on actual land

use, as stated by the appellate court, is that the Act explicitly
states its purpose to include preservation of "the natural scenic
beauty of lands bordering on [the] highways," and therefore
"allowing outdoor advertising in areas without other businesses
or highway services in the vicinity would violate essential
purposes of the . . . Act."

J&.

The Court of Appeals quotation

of the Act's statement of purpose as a background against which
it read section 27-12-136.3(3) is consistent with settled law
that "[i]n order to give a statute its true meaning and
significance it should be considered in the light of its
background and the purpose sought to be accomplished . . . ."
Snyder v. Clune. 15 Utah 2d 254, 255, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964).4

4

These purposes are consistent with Utah Rule, the UtahFederal Agreement (incorporated by reference in Utah Code Ann. §
27-12-136.2 and included in Appendix A and the record at R. 741751), and the Federal Highway Beautification Act. In Rule R9332-1 of the Utah Administrative Code it is provided that
11
[N] othing in these rules shall be construed to permit outdoor
advertising that would disqualify the State for Federal
participation of funds under the Federal Standards applicable."
The Federal Standards include the Utah-Federal Agreement, "the
purpose of [which] is to promote the reasonable, orderly, and
effective display of outdoor advertising while remaining
23

It cannot be determined whether those purposes are being
violated without considering whether the area has a natural,
scenic and beautiful character to preserve.

"Actual land use,"

therefore, includes use as a natural, scenic, beautiful setting
for the highway.
"Actual land use" includes the presence or absence of ,
commercial usage, such as commercial buildings and services such
as water, sewer and electricity.

A solely pristine and scenic

use militates against the lawfulness of the area for billboards,
given the policy of the Act, whereas substantial incidents of

consistent with the national policy to protect the public
investment in interstate and primary highways, to promote the
safety and recreational vali of public travel and to preserve
natural beauty . . . "
Utah— ^deral Agreement (emphasis added).
Under the Utah-Federal Agreement, Utah agreed "to implement and
carry out the provisions of Section 131 of Title 23, United
States Code, and the national policy in order to remain eligible
to receive the full amount of all federal highway funds . . . ."
23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1994) directs the withholding of a state's
fur.ds when the state is not in compliance. The Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), through its Utah right-of-way officer,
stated in his affidavit that since the three proposed signs at
Anderson Junction violate the Federal policy governing outdoor
advertising, he has advised the Utah Department of Transportation
that unless these three signs at Anderson Junction are removed,
he will recommend to the FHWA withholding of a portion of Utah's
Federal Highway Funds. (R. 571-573.)
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non-billboard commercial usage would militate in favor of the
lawfulness of the area for billboards, showing that the primary
purpose served by the zoning was not allowing outdoor
advertising.
The appellate court was not directing the district court to
engage in the purely academic exercise of looking at "actual land
use" and then, after finding that use to be solely natural and
scenic without any commercial incidents, to dismiss the finding
as irrelevant to its resolution of the case.

Nor was the

appellate court directing the district court to refuse even to
consider the "natural scenic beauty of the land[ ] bordering on
the highway[ ] . " Yet this is precisely what the district court
on remand did.
Evidence was replete and uncontradicted that the area of the
signs was natural, scenic and beautiful, with no commercial
incidents, and therefore subject to preservation under the policy
of the Act.

This evidence is marshaled above in the Statement of

Facts in its subparts 2 and 3.

Yet the trial court failed to

conform its judgment to the logical conclusion to which that

25

evidence pointed.

This failure in disregard of the direction of

the Utah Court of Appeals is error.
B.

Failure to Consider Perpetuation of Zoning for
Signs

The Court of Appeals directed consideration of "any evidence
that the zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning
designation," 913 P.2d at 769, as a factor bearing on whether, in
reality, the area was "zoned for the primary purpose of allowing
outdoor advertising."

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3).

The

Washington County zoning as "commercial" had been determined by
the UDOT Order on Remand to be for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising, thereby rendering the area of the
signs unlawful for signs.

(R. 461-64.)

And the Court of Appeals

held that Kunz was bound by that UDOT Order on jhe ground of res
judicata.

913 P.2d at 769.

The Court of Appeals therefore

reasonably determined that to perpetuate the zoning designation
already held to render the area unlawful for signs would also
perpetuate the unlawfulness of the area for signs.
Moreover, evidence that Toquerville perpetuated the prior
Washington County zoning designation was adduced, but the
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district court made no finding based on it.

This was error.

Planners indicated they considered several factors before
the annexation and zoning.

Kenneth Sizemore, a witness for Kunz,

stated that they looked at "existing zoning of Washington
County," "owner's desires" and "tax base benefits that commercial
development at the interchange would bring to Toquerville town."
(R. 902.)

The second two of these three considerations are

treated below and support the conclusion the property was zoned
for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.

The

first is relevant here, however, and shows the focus of the
planners on the prior zoning.
That focus of the preliminary advisors is subsumed by the
testimony of Mayor Walquist, a member of the town council that
actually voted -- thereby taking the legislative action that
placed the town's annexation and zoning into law.

The following

dialogue underscores the supremacy of the Town Council's vote
over the musings of preliminary advisors.
Q. As the town council, it's the town council who
makes the final decisions on annexation and zoning;
isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
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Q.
A.
to us.
Q.
A.
(R. 989.)

And not the earlier advisors?
No. They just submitted their recommendation
And it's -- it's you who makes the final decision?
Yes.

Further, the Mayor acknowledged that the statements he

had made by affidavit were correct that Toquerville left the
zoning of the Eveleth land the signs were on just as it was in
the county.

His testimony is as follows:

THE COURT: Is that your signature, Mr. Wahlquist?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON: May I have the document.
Q. I'm going to read what is in this document and
ask you if it's correct. The annexation of the
property by the Town of Toquerville and the town's
zoning of the property as commercial made no change in
the zoning status of the property inasmuch as the
property was zoned highway commercial both before and
after the Toquerville zoning. Toquerville left the
zoning of the Eveleth land the sigra are on just as it
was when the land was only in the county. Is that
correct?
A. At that time, yes. See, that was part -- what's
the date on that?
Q. Oh, it's August 10, 1994.
(R. 985.)
That Toquerville merely perpetuated the prior Washington
County zoning designation is the law of the case.
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The district

court found in earlier proceedings that "Toquerville retain[ed]
the same zoning category the property had held when in the unincorporated area of Washington County."5

Kunz did not object to

that finding of fact when the district court entertained
counsel's argument on the proposed findings, except as to
relevancy on the ground that the district court's ruling against
res judicata made the statement irrelevant.

Although the Court

of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling on res judicata,
the factual accuracy of the statement remained unassailed.

(R.

789-90.)
Further, the Court of Appeals likewise stated as a fact that
in "November of [1993] the town of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's
property and chose to retain the "highway commercial" zoning for
the area."

913 P.2d at 767.

This perpetuation of the Washington

County zoning action that the Court of Appeals held as a matter
of law "was for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising," 913 P.2d at 769, requires a conclusion that the

5

Fifth District Court's findings in earlier proceedings, R.
595, 618, 619, 625.
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signs are likewise unlawful under Toquerville's zoning.

The

district court's failure to follow the direction of the Court of
Appeals to consider Toquerville's perpetuation of the prior
zoning designation of Washington County was error.
C.

Failure to Consider Toquerville's Annexation and
Zoning of Land at the Request of the Person on
Whose Land the Signs Stood and Would Stand

The owner of the land on which the signs would stand -- the
lessor of the land to Kunz -- has an obvious financial interest
in a zoning category that would accommodate signs.

Thomas

Eveleth is, and at all times relevant has been, the owner of that
land.

(R. 1043.)

Then, we discover through one of Kunz•s own

witnesses, the land was annexed and zoned by Toquerville at the
request of none other than Thomas Eveleth and that the land would
not have been annexed and zoned by Toquerville without the
request of Mr. Eveleth.

The following testimony was given:

By a phone call Mr. Eveleth talked with the town
clerk, Chester Adams, and requested that his additional
property to the north of the proposed annexation be
included in the annexation process, and that
information must have been conveyed to me because I
adjusted the boundary of the proposed annexation to
include all of Mr. Eveleth's property as well as some
additional property on the east side of 1-15. And so
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that was the reason it was changed was because there
was a formal - - a n informal request made.
(R. 855-56.)
Also:
Q. Which is the property that was included at
Eveleth's suggestion that would have not been included
without that suggestion?
A. Everything north of this section 27 and west of
1-15 was requested by Tom Eveleth and his wife to be
included in the annexation process.
Q. Was there a portion of that that was not included
in the original plan?
A. Yes.
Q. What part of that?
A. Everything north of section 27 was originally not
included in the annexation proposal. It was subsequent
to his phone call, and I have a letter from him in my
file now that verifies that he requested that
additional property north of section 27 west of 1-15 be
included in the annexation.
(R. 876.)
There is no question that the land annexed at the Eveleths
request is the land the signs were and would be on:
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, in order -- following the
Court's lead here to perhaps expedite this a little
bit, plaintiffs are perfectly willing to stipulate that
the three outdoor sign structures are located in the
northwest triangular portion of Mr. Eveleth's property
that appears on Exhibit 1 as the northwest side of
Interstate 15 in the bump on the annexation at the very
top of that annexation and their exact location, I
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don't think, is necessarily too material.
there. We don't dispute that.

They are

(R. 882-83.)
That Eveleth's request was a sine qua non without which the
land would not have been taken and zoned by Toquerville, is
consistent with Mr. Sizemore's indication that one of three
factors the planners considered was "the owners' desires."

This

evidence linking the signs to the annexation and zoning, through
Mr. Eveleth, supports the conclusion that the zoning was for the
"primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising."

The trial

court's failure to enter any finding regarding it -- an
indication the court declined to consider it -- was error.
D.

Failure to Consider Tax Revenues From Signs

In addition to the perpetuation of the zoning of the land by
Washington County that was unlawful for signs under the UDOT
remand order and Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913 P.2d at 769,
and the owner's desires, the third factor Mr. Sizemore said he
considered was "potential tax base benefits."

(R. 902.

See

also, R. 947 ("helping tax revenue of the Town of Toquerville").)
As stated by the Court of Appeals: "In enacting section 27-1232

136.3(3), the legislature must have contemplated that local
zoning bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from
lands adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow
outdoor advertising." 913 P.2d at 769.

Thus, rezoning to

commercial coupled with no commercial activity except for signs
is significant circumstantial evidence of violation of section
27-12-136.3(3).

913 P.2d at 769.

Here, no commercial activity has ever been conducted on the
land except for the signs, and, without culinary water or sewer
and being at least 2000 feet from the intersection, the area of
the signs does not have any reasonable prospect of commercial
activity in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, the only

commercial activity on the land that met or could meet the object
of the planners to "help[] tax revenue of the Town of
Toquerville" (R. 947), is the signs.

This circumstance supports

the conclusion that the "primary purpose of [the zoning is]
allowing outdoor advertising."
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AS UNWORKABLE
UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.3(3) AFTER THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAD IDENTIFIED THAT SECTION AS CONTROLLING AND
DIRECTED THE DISTRICT COURT TO FOLLOW IT
The Court of Appeals identified subsection 27-12-136.3(3) as

controlling in connection with its discussion of the policy of
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to preserve natural beauty of
the lands adjacent to the highways.

Further, the Court of

Appeals directed the district court to consider certain objective
factors that bear on whether an area is zoned for the primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising in light of the
Legislature's recognition that objective circumstances are likely
to be more probative than subjective statements of intent of a
zoning body.

It was the duty of the district court to understand

the Court of Appeals' decision and apply it.

It was a violation

of that duty, however creative or well-intentioned, for the
district court to disregard the letter and spirit of the Court of
Appeal's decision and embark on a journey of its own, as the
above argument discloses it did.

See Slattery v. Covey, 909 P.2d

at 928 (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d at 103738)(requiring the lower court to "implement both the letter and
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the spirit of the [appellate] court's mandate").
The district court's disregard of the controlling law is
graphically illustrated by the following statement of the court
in its oral presentation of findings of fact and conclusions of
law:
I observe parenthetically that the legislative use
within 27-12-136.3 sub 3 of the phrase primary purpose
of allowing outdoor advertising probably does not
accomplish the intent -- the announced intent of the
act or give any kind of reasonable framework within
which courts may determine issues of these kinds.
I would suspect that it would be a rare case if the
Court could find evidence that the primary purpose was
to build billboards.
(R. 1068.)

The district court's disregard was error and this

Court should itself apply the law to the facts that were fully
elucidated at trial and established the area as zoned for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
CONCLUSION
The declaratory judgment of the district court should be
vacated, and this Court should finally resolve this case by its
own declaratory decision.

The area is unlawful for signs under

statutes and rules incorporating federal policy and under Utah
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Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) as construed by the Utah Court
of Appeals. The evidence established that the area is "zoned for
the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising."

Thus, the

general prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.4(1) (1995)
renders the area unlawful for signs.

This Court should so

declare.
//
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ADDENDUM A

27-12-136.1

HIGHWAYS

27-12-136.1. "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act"— Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act."
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, 5 1.
Meaning of "this act"— Laws 1967, ch. 51
enacted 5$ 27-12-136.1 to 27-12-136.13.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
.
Nonconforming use.
Clte(1
Nonconforming use.
State could not compel removal of outdoor
advertising sign on ground that sign violated
this act blcaSe advertising had Istablished
prior nonconforming use and sign in question
substantially complied with negotiations be-

tween parties and was constructed without
objection by commission, and no procedure for
paying just compensation for removal of sign
had been pursued by the state. National Adv.
Co-v- U t a h S t a t e M - Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132,
^ 6 P- 2d 383 (1971).
_.. . . TT, • T* ,A r « ,
«
. <?*** » Vf> * P * p * ^ P ; ? » • * • *
u
r Adv
° *°°
'
1988
'-

27-12-136.2. Purpose of act.
The purpose of this act is to provide the statutory basis for the regulation of
outdoor advertising consistent with zoning principles and standards and the
public policy of this state in providing public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment in such
highways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty of lands bordering on such
highways, and to ensure that information in the specific interest of the
traveling public is presented safely and effectively.
The agreement entered into between the governor of the state of Utah and
the secretary of transportation of the United States dated January 18, 1968,
regarding the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising which may be
erected and maintained within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary
highway systems which are zoned commercial or industrial or in such other
unzoned commercial or industrial areas as defined pursuant to the terms of
such agreement is hereby ratified and approved.
History: L. 1967, ch. 51,1 2; 1971, ch. 61,
SI.

27-12-136.3.

Meaning of "this act" — See note under
§ 27-12-136.1.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commercial or industrial activities" means those activities generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this
state, except that none of the following are commercial or industrial
activities:
(a) agricultural, forestry, grazing, farming, and related activities,
including wayside fresh produce stands;
(b) transient or temporary activities;
(c) activities not visible from the main-traveled way;
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(d) activities conducted in a building principally used as a residence; and
(e) railroad tracks and minor sidings.
(2) "Commercial or industrial zone" means only:
(a) those areas within the boundaries of cities or towns that are
used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations;
(b) those areas within the boundaries of urbanized counties that
are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations;
(c) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and
outside the boundaries of cities and towns that:
(i) are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or
zoned as a highway service zone, under comprehensive local
zoning ordinances or regulations or enabling state legislation;
and
(ii) are within 8420 feet of an interstate highway exit, offramp, or turnoff as measured from the nearest point of the
beginning or ending of the pavement widening at the exit from or
entrance to the main-traveled way; or
(d) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and
outside the boundaries of cities and towns and not within 8420 feet of
an interstate highway exit, off-ramp, or turnoff as measured from the
nearest point of the beginning or ending of the pavement widening at
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way that are reserved
for business, commerce, or trade under enabling state legislation or
comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations, and are actually used for commercial or industrial purposes.
(3) "Commercial or industrial zone" does not mean areas zoned for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
(4) "Comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations" means a
municipality's comprehensive plan required by Section 10-9-301, the
municipal zoning plan authorized by Section 10-9-401, and the county
master plan authorized by Sections 17-27-301 and 17-27-401.
(5) "Department" means the Department of Transportation.
(6) "Directional signs" means signs containing information about public
places owned or operated by federal, state, or local governments or their
agencies, publicly or privately owned natural phenomena, historic, cultural, scientific, educational, or religious sites, and areas of natural scenic
beauty or naturally suited for outdoor recreation, that the department
considers to be in the interest of the traveling public.
(7) (a) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix,
attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being.
(b) "Erect" does not include any activities defined in Subsection (a)
if they are performed incident to the change of an advertising message
or customary maintenance of a sign.
(8) "Highway service zone" means a highway service area where the
primary use of the land is used or reserved for commercial and roadside
services other than outdoor advertising to serve the traveling public.
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PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION
R 9 3 3 . P r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , R i g h t of Way
Acquisition.
R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition.
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs.
R933-3. Relocation or Modification of Existing Authorized
Access Openings or Granting New Access Openings on
Limited Access Highways.
R933-1. R i g h t of Way A c q u i s i t i o n .
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquisition Incorporation of Federal Publication.
R933-1-1. R i g h t of Way A c q u i s i t i o n Incorporat i o n of F e d e r a l P u b l i c a t i o n .
The State of Utah incorporates by reference 49
CFR 24 as amended in the Federal Register, March
2, 1989, as its administrative rules on the acquisition of rights of way.
References: 27-12-89 through 103.
History: 13864, AMD, 01/14/93.

R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising
Signs.
R933-2-1. Purpose.
R933-2-2. Federal Regulations.
R933-2-3. Definitions.
R933-2-4. Permits.
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance.
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: Limitations
in Zoned or Unzoned Areas.
R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs.
R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs.
R933-2-9. lermination of Non-Conforming Use Status.
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Nonconforming —
Removal.
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status — Removal.
R933-2-12. Directional Signs.
R933-2-13. Official Signs.
R933-2-14. Department Hearings.
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or Rules.
R933-2-16. Saving Clause.
R933-2-17. Effective Date.
R933-2-1. P u r p o s e .
The purpose of these rules is to implement the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. Nothing in these
rules shall be construed to permit outdoor advertising t h a t would disqualify the State for Federal
participation of funds under the Federal standards
applicable. The Transportation Commission and the
Utah Department of Transportation shall, through
designated personnel, control outdoor advertising on
interstate and primary highway systems.
R933-2-2. F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s .
The federal regulations governing outdoor advertising contained in 23 CFR section 750.101 through
section 750.713 (April 1, 1994) are adopted and
incorporated by this reference.
J a n u a r y 1,1996

R933-2-3

R933-2-3. Definitions.
All references in these Rules to Sections 27-12136.1 through 27-12-136.13, are to those sections of
t h e Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. In addition to the definitions in Section
27-12-136.3, the following definitions are supplied:
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign,
t h e sign facing of which has been partially obliterated, h a s been painted out, has remained blank or
h a s obsolete advertising matter for a continuous
period of twelve (12) months or more.
(2) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
(3) "Advertising" means any message, whether in
words, symbols, pictures or any combination thereof,
painted or otherwise applied to the face of an outdoor advertising structure, which message is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and
which message is visible from any place on the main
travel-way of the interstate or primary highway
system.
(4) "Areas zoned for t h e primary purpose of outdoor advertising*' as used in Subsection 27-12136.3(3) of the Act is denned to include areas in
which the primary activity is outdoor advertising.
(5) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in
Subsection 27-12-136.3(2)(d) of the Act is further
defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside
t h e boundaries of urbanized counties and outside
t h e boundaries of cities and towns referred to in t h a t
subsection, such areas not within 8420 feet of an
interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as
measured from the nearest point of the beginning or
ending of t h e pavement widening at the exit from or
entrance to the main traveled way t h a t are reserved
for business, commerce, or trade under enabling
state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations, and are actually used for
commercial or industrial purposes, including the
land along both sides of a controlled highway for 600
feet immediately abutting the area of use, measurem e n t s under this subsection being made from the
outer edge of regularly used buildings, parking lots,
gate-houses, entrance gates, or storage or processing
areas.
(6) "Conforming Sign" means an off-premise sign
maintained in a location t h a t conforms to the size,
lighting, spacing, zoning and usage requirements as
provided by law and these rules.
(7) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign
t h a t is designed, intended, or used to advertise or
inform any p a r t of the advertising or informative
contents of which is visible from any place on the
main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid
primary highway in this State.
(8) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by
n a t u r a l elements wherein the costs of re-erection
exceeds 30 percent of the depreciated value of the
sign as established by departmental appraisal methods.
(9) "Freeway* m e a n s a divided highway for
through traffic with full control access.
(10) "Grandfather Status" refers to any offpremise controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned
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awarding the natural father his costs and
attorney fees incurred after September 8,
1993. See Schoney v. Memorial Estates,
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App.1993) (holding no abuse of discretion awarding costs and
attorney fees when sanctions were warranted).
CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm the sanctions imposed
by the trial court and award the natural
father his costs and attorney fees incurred on
appeal. We remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of the amount of
the award on appeal.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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KUNZ & COMPANY dba Kunz Outdoor
Advertising, a California corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
STATE of Utah, Utah Department
of Transportation, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 950186-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 14, 1996.
Outdoor advertising corporation sought
order declaring signs on property adjacent to
interstate highway to be in compliance with
state law and providing injunctive relief.
The Fifth District Court, Washington County, James L. Shumate, J., entered summary
judgment for corporation. Department of
Transportation appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) property
reserved for commercial or industrial use in
city or town could be excluded from use for
outdoor advertising near highway if zoning

violated statute providing that "commercial
or industrial zone" does not mean areas
zoned for primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising; (2) fact issues existed as to
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of
land was to allow outdoor advertising; (3)
corporation was bound by order of Department concerning signs; and (4) corporation
was required to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to obtaining renewal permits before seeking order in district court
providing declaratory and injunctive relief.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <s=>863
In considering appeal from summary
judgment, Court of Appeals reviews trial
court's legal conclusions, including its conclusion that material facts are not disputed, for
correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error <3=>863
Standard of review of summary judgment allows Court of Appeals to make its
own conclusions and does not obligate it to
defer to trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
56(c).
3. Highways <3=153.5
Area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in city or town need not actually have
commercial development on it to satisfy highway code's definition of "commercial or industrial zone" as including areas used or
reserved for business. U.CA.1953, 27-12136.3(2)(a).
4. Highways <3=>153.5
Area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in city or town which does not actually
have commercial development on it may be
excluded from use for outdoor advertising
near highway if the zoning violates statute
providing that "commercial or industrial
zone" does not mean areas zoned for primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
U.CA1953,
27-12-136.3(3),
27-12136.4(l)(d).
5. Zoning and Planning <3=>624
In determining primary purpose behind
particular zoning decision, fact finder can and
should consider all relevant evidence, not just
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stated purpose of zoning body or local government; this would include evidence of actual land use or any evidence that zoning
body merely perpetuated prior zoning designation.
6. Judgment <s>181(15.1)
Issues of material fact existed as to
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of
land to commercial use was to allow outdoor
advertising, such that land would be required
by statute to be excluded from use for outdoor advertising, precluding summary judgment. U.CA.1953, 27-12-136.3(3); Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
7. Highways <3=>157
Outdoor advertising corporation was
bound under doctrine of res judicata by order of Department of Transportation concerning removal of billboards, even though
corporation had not been party to proceedings in which order was issued, where corporation was privy to, and subsequent assignee
of, corporation which had been party to such
proceedings.
8. Judgment <S=>681
Court would not adopt test set forth in
Restatement of Judgments (Second), providing various exceptions to applicability of res
judicata to successor of property interest
when that party is subject of pending litigation to which transferor of interest, rather
than successor, is party. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44.
9. Judgment <3>713(2), 720
Res judicata applies only as to those
issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which party had
fair opportunity to present and have determined in other proceeding.
10. Highways <3=>153.5
Although outdoor advertising corporation was bound under doctrine of res judicata
by prior adjudication of Department of
Transportation that county's zoning of land
was for primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising, it was not bound by any adjudication as to whether town's zoning was for
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising, since town's annexation and rezoning

of land occurred nearly eight months after
order was issued. U.CA.1953, 27-12136.3(3).
11. Highways <S>153.5,157
Regardless of whether outdoor advertising signs adjacent to highway were located in
valid commercial or industrial zone, they
were illegal and subject to removal where
sign owner had not obtained valid permits for
signs. U.CA.1953, 27-12-136.4(1 )(d), 27-12136.7(l)(a).
12. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>662
Highways <3=>153.5,159(2)
Outdoor advertising corporation was required to exhaust administrative remedies
with regard to obtaining renewal permits for
signs before seeking order in district court
declaring signs to be in compliance with state
law and providing injunctive relief; statute
providing district courts with jurisdiction to
review final orders of Department of Transportation resulting from formal and informal
adjudicative proceedings did not relieve corporation from exhausting its administrative
remedies, order denying permits was not final order under such statute, and order did
not result from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings.
U.CA.1953, 27-12136.9(4)(a).
13. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=*662
Highways <3=>153.5
Where outdoor advertising corporation
did not exhaust its administrative remedies
with regard to sign permits, neither trial
court nor Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
to reverse, alter, or otherwise circumvent
that particular agency action. U.CA.1953,
63-46b-l(8).
Appeal from Fifth District, Washington
County; The Honorable James L. Shumate,
Judge.
Jan Graham and Ralph L. Finlayson, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
D. Williams Ronnow and John J. Walton,
St. George, for Appellee.
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door advertising, UDOT revoked the permits and ordered the signs' immediate removal.
Lundgren appealed the UDOT order to
WILKINS, Judge:
this court. However, in December 1989, durThe Utah Department of Transportation ing pendency of the appeal, Washington
(UDOT) appeals the district court's grant of County rezoned Eveleth's property as "highsummary judgment in favor of Kunz & Com- way commercial." After UDOT informed
this court of the changed circumstances, we
pany. We reverse and remand.
remanded the case to UDOT in April 1990.
BACKGROUND
UDOT conducted further proceedings,
which
involved only the parties to the appeal,
Thomas Eveleth owns real property adjaUDOT
and Lundgren. Subsequently, in
cent to Interstate 15 in Washington County,
near the Anderson Junction. In March 1986, February 1993, UDOT issued a new order
Eveleth applied to the county for a zoning ruling that although Eveleth's property was
change, seeking to change the zoning of his now zoned "commercial," the rezoning was
property from "agricultural" to "highway for the "primary purpose" of allowing outdoor advertising, thereby disqualifying the
commercial."
property for that use, pursuant to section 27Prior to obtaining the zoning change,
12-136.3(3) of the Utah Code.
Eveleth entered into an agreement with
UDOT sent the Order on Remand, which
Lundgren Outdoor Advertising (Lundgren)
revoked
the permits for the three signs and
whereby Eveleth would lease his property to
ordered
their removal, to Lundgren and
Lundgren for the purpose of placing and
Eveleth.
However, ownership of the signs
maintaining billboards on the property. In
had
changed
prior to the issuance of UDOT's
July 1987, Eveleth and Lundgren applied to
final
order.
Two years earlier, in February
UDOT for permits to construct three bill1991,
Kunz
& Company (Kunz) had purboards on the property along 1-15. Each
chased
the
billboards
from Leonard & Comapplication certified that "the sign is in full
pany,
a
successor
to
Lundgren.
compliance with the [Outdoor Advertising]
Act," and that Eveleth's property is zoned
In September 1993, UDOT sent a letter to
"commercial." In fact, the property was still Kunz explaining the illegality of the signs
zoned "agricultural" at the time. Neverthe- and providing a copy of the UDOT Order on
less, UDOT granted the permits, and Lund- Remand. Nevertheless, Kunz did not take
gren proceeded to erect the three signs later any steps to intervene or appeal that order.
that year.
Subsequently, in November of that year,
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and
WILKINS, JJ.

In March 1988, UDOT notified Lundgren
that the property was not zoned "commercial," as was claimed in the permit applications. Lundgren then notified Eveleth of
this problem, and Eveleth took further steps
to obtain the zoning change.

the town of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's
property and chose to retain the "highway
commercial" zoning for the area. However,
there is not now, nor has there ever been,
any commercial development on the property
other than the three billboards.

In August 1989, UDOT held a hearing on
the matter to determine the legality of the
signs pursuant to the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act (codified at that time at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 27-12-136.1 to -136.13 (1989)).
UDOT ruled that the three billboards violated sections 27-12-136.4, -136.9, and -136.3(3)
because the billboards were located on property that was not zoned "commercial" nor
could be deemed such for purposes of out-

On January 18, 1994, Kunz applied for
renewal permits for the signs. UDOT denied the application, and on February 16,
Kunz filed an action for declaratory judgment in district court. Kunz sought a declaration from the trial court that "due to the
annexation and rezoning of the subject property, the billboards are now in compliance
with applicable state law, specifically ... the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and that re-
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moval of the billboards is not warranted
thereunder." The parties also agreed to
have the trial court determine "the effect [on
Kunz] (if any) of the UDOT District Five
'Order on Remand.'" Finally, Kunz sought
permanent injunctive relief, enjoining UDOT
and the State "from any removal of, or hindrance of Kunz's access to, the billboards."
During the course of the proceedings,
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment,
and Kunz filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment. In December 1994, the trial court
denied UDOT's motion and granted Kunz's
cross-motion. Specifically, the trial court
held that Kunz is not bound by UDOT's
Order on Remand and that the three signs
comply with the provisions of the Outdoor
Advertising Act. UDOT appeals.
ANALYSIS
[1,2] As is the case whenever we consider an appeal from a summary judgment, we
review the trial court's legal conclusions, including its conclusion that the material facts
are not disputed, for correctness. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law"). This standard allows us to
make our own conclusions and does not obligate us to defer to the trial court. See State
v. Penou 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
I. Application of Outdoor Advertising Act
Kunz specifically asked the trial court to
declare that "the billboards, as presently situated on [Eveleth's] property, lie within a
bona fide commercial zone not created or
existing for the primary purpose of outdoor
advertising," which would qualify the area for
billboards under the Outdoor Advertising
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12136.4(l)(d) (1995). Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, "[a]ny person . . . affected by a statute . . . may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising
under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Id. § 78-33-2 (1992).
Thus, the trial court in this case could properly decide the issue. See id. § 78-33-1.

The trial court concluded that the current
zoning of Eveleth's land met the requirements of the Outdoor Advertising Act and
thereby permitted the use of billboards on
the property. In reaching this conclusion,
the court specifically relied on the fact that
Toquerville has zoned the area as "highway
commercial." See id. § 27-12-136.4(1 )(d)
(1995) (permitting the use of outdoor advertising in a "commercial or industrial zone").
The court found this designation sufficient to
fall within the statutory definition for such a
zone as provided in the Outdoor Advertising
Act.
Section 27-12-136.3(2)(a) defines "[commercial or industrial zone," in the relevant
part, as "those areas within the boundaries of
cities or towns that are used or reserved for
business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state
legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations." Id. § 27-12136.3(2)(a). In addition, a subsequent provision in the Act limits the definitions found in
subsection (2) by establishing that "'[c]ommercial or industrial zone' does not mean
areas zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." Id. § 27-12136.3(3).
The trial court construed the use of the
term "reserved" in subsection (2)(a) to mean
that the property does not actually need to
have commercial development on it, but that
it merely be zoned for that purpose. Thus,
the court determined that the current zoning
of Eveleth's land satisfied the statute, despite
the fact that the three signs represent the
only commercial development on the property. The trial court further concluded that
the "exclusionary definition" in section 2712-136.3(3) referred only "to the areas outside incorporated cities and towns."
[3,4] While we agree that an area zoned
for commercial or industrial use in a city or
town need not actually have commercial development on it to satisfy the definition in
section 27-12-136.3(2)(a), we conclude that
such property may still be excluded from use
for outdoor advertising if the zoning violates
section 27-12-136.3(3). The trial court erred
in deciding that this latter provision applied
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only to areas outside of incorporated cities
and towns.
In enacting section 27-12-136.3(3), the legislature must have contemplated that local
zoning bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from lands adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow outdoor
advertising. However, allowing outdoor advertising in areas without other businesses or
highway services in the vicinity would violate
essential purposes of the Outdoor Advertising Act—enacted in part to promote the
"convenience and enjoyment of public travel,
to protect the public investment in such highways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty
of lands bordering on such highways, and to
ensure that information in the specific interest of the traveling public is presented safely
and effectively." Id. § 27-12-136.2. Accordingly, if a zoning body designates specific
land as "commercial" for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising on that
land, then section 27-12-136.3(3) prohibits
the use of billboards on the land regardless
of whether or not the zoning body also intends to "reserve" the land for other commercial use.
[5,6] Furthermore, in determining the
primary purpose behind a particular zoning
decision, the fact finder can and should consider all relevant evidence, not just the stated purpose of the zoning body or local government. This would include evidence of
actual land use or any evidence that the
zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning designation. Inasmuch as Kunz and
UDOT have presented conflicting evidence as
to Toquerville's primary purpose behind the
zoning of Eveleth's land, we conclude that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. We
therefore reverse and remand for trial to
allow the fact finder to determine the primary purpose for the zoning decision.
II. Effect of Order on Remand
UDOT argued before the trial court that
UDOT's Final Order on Remand, issued in
February 1993, constitutes an enforceable order against Kunz and has res judicata effect
on the issues of this case. In light of these
arguments, Kunz and UDOT agreed to have
the trial court decide what effect, if any, the

Order on Remand has on Kunz and this case.
The trial court ruled that because Kunz was
not a party to the previous UDOT proceedings and did not receive adequate legal notice
of those proceedings, Kunz was not bound by
the Order on Remand.
[7] Nevertheless, the trial court failed to
recognize the significance of the fact that one
of Kunz's predecessors in interest, Lundgren,
was a party to those proceedings. Res judicata applies to the same parties and to their
privies or assignees. DyAston v. Aston, 844
P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App.1992). As a privy
to, and subsequent assignee of, Lundgren's
interests in the billboards, Kunz is bound by
the UDOT Order on Remand to the same
extent as Lundgren. The trial court erred in
ruling otherwise.
[8] Kunz proposes that we adopt the test
set forth in the Second Restatement of Judgments, which provides various exceptions to
the applicability of res judicata to a successor
of a property interest when that property is
the subject of a pending litigation to which
the transferor of the interest, rather than the
successor, is a party. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982). Utah has
not adopted the Restatement test, and we
decline to do so now.
[9,10] Even so, the Order on Remand is
res judicata only " 'as to those issues which
were either tried and determined, or upon all
issues which the party had a fair opportunity
to present and have determined in the other
proceeding;" DAston, 844 P.2d at 350
(quoting Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App.1988)). Kunz is
therefore bound by the prior adjudication
that Washington County's zoning of Eveleth's land was for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising. However, this
action involves a different set of facts, which
have not been adjudicated: Whether Toquerville's zoning, rather than Washington County's zoning, was for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising. Toquerville's
annexation and zoning of Eveleth's land occurred nearly eight months after UDOT issued its Order on Remand. Accordingly, the
trial court was porrect to the extent it con-
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eluded that the Order on Remand was not
binding on this particular issue.
III. Further Relief Sought by Kunz
As part of its declaratory action, Kunz also
sought an order declaring the billboards to
be in compliance with state law, declaring
them exempt from any removal requirements, and granting permanent injunctive
relief to prevent UDOT and the State from
removing the signs. Under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, a party may seek any further
relief that is necessary or proper in light of
the declaratory judgment issued by the trial
court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1992).
Nevertheless, the trial court cannot grant the
relief asked for in this case.
[11] Regardless of whether the signs are
found to be located in a valid commercial or
industrial zone, the signs are still illegal and
subject to removal, because Kunz has not
obtained valid permits for the signs. See id.
§ 27-12-136.7(l)(a) (1995) ("Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a current permit."); id. § 27-12-136.9(l)(b)
("Outdoor advertising is unlawful when . . . a
permit is not obtained as required by this
chapter.").
[12] In January 1994, Kunz applied to
UDOT for renewal permits for the three
billboards. When UDOT denied the applications, Kunz did not exhaust its administrative
remedies, but instead filed this declaratory
action in district court. Kunz claims that
exhaustion of remedies is not required in this
case because the state legislature has provided that "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final
orders of the Department of Transportation
under this section resulting from formal and
informal adjudicative proceedings."
Id
§ 27-12-136.9(4)(a).
However, Kunz's argument that section
27-12-136.9 allows Kunz to proceed directly
to district court for the relief sought is disingenuous. First, this section does not relieve
Kunz from exhausting its administrative
remedies. See id § 63-46b-14(2) (1993) ("A
party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except" under circumstances not appli-

cable to this case.). Furthermore, the
UDOT order denying the permits is not a
final order under this section, nor is Kunz
seeking review of that order in this action.
See id. § 27-12-136.9(4)(a) (1995). Most importantly, the UDOT order denying the permits is not a final order resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings
as required under this section. See id.
Once UDOT denied Kunz's applications for
new permits, Kunz should have requested
further agency action, seeking adjudicative
proceedings to determine whether the permits should have been granted in light of
Toquerville's annexation and rezoning of
Eveleth's property. See Utah Code Admin.P. R907-1-3(B)(3) (indicating how adjudicative processes may be petitioned for by
persons outside UDOT). UDOT's administrative rules specifically provide for adjudicative proceedings pursuant to the Outdoor
Advertising Act. Id R907-1-1 (A)(2). Such
proceedings would commence informally and
convert to formal proceedings if necessary.
See id R907-1-KA), -5(F), & -15(B). Indeed, Administrative Rule 907-l-15(B) specifically establishes:
No final order is issued in the informal
phase if there is a timely objection and
request for hearing made. If such a timely objection and request for hearing is
made, the matter is treated as a contested
case which is processed as a formal proceeding before the Director. Such right to
have the matter be contested and processed "formally" is an available and adequate administrative remedy and should be
exercised prior to seeking judicial review.
Nevertheless, Kunz chose not to exhaust its
administrative remedies following UDOT's
denial of the new permits. Before Kunz
could claim on appeal that UDOT erred in
denying the permits, UDOT should have had
the opportunity to correct the alleged error.
See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm% 861 P.2d 414, 423-24 (Utah
1993) (recognizing that the correction principle underpins the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies); see also Maverik
Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, 860
P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App.1993) ("The basic
purpose underlying the doctrine . . . 'is to
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allow an administrative agency to perform
functions within its special competence—to
make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies.'" (quoting Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818,
31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972))).
[13] Because Kunz did not exhaust its
administrative remedies with regard to the
sign permits, neither the trial court nor this
court has jurisdiction to reverse, alter, or
otherwise circumvent that particular agency
action. See Maverik Country Stores, 860
P.2d at 947-48; see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(8) (Supp.1995) ("Nothing in this
chapter may be interpreted to provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction to review
final agency action.") Accordingly, the trial
court cannot order UDOT to grant the permits. Without the permits, the billboards
are illegal, and the trial court is without
jurisdiction to change the signs' legal status
and grant the further relief requested by
Kunz in its declaratory action. See Utah
Code Ann. § 7&-33-8 (1992) ("Further relief
based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted when necessary or proper.
The application therefor shall be by petition
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the
relief." (emphasis added)).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in concluding that
section 27-12-136.3(3) applies only to areas
outside incorporated cities and towns. Outdoor advertising is prohibited in any location
zoned for the "primary purpose of allowing
outdoor advertising." Because Kunz and
UDOT have presented conflicting evidence
regarding Toquerville's primary purpose behind its zoning of Eveleth's land, we reverse
the grant of summary judgment and remand
for a trial on that issue.
The trial court also erred in concluding
that the UDOT Order on Remand has no
binding effect on Kunz. Nevertheless, res
judicata does not bar adjudication of the new
issue presented in this action.
Finally, the trial court is without jurisdiction to declare the billboards to be in complete compliance with the Outdoor Advertis-

ing Act because Kunz did not exhaust its
administrative remedies following UDOT's
denial of the new sign permits. The trial
court cannot exempt the billboards from removal requirements or grant the injunctive
relief requested in this action.
Reversed and remanded.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, In the Interest of E.K., a
person under eighteen years of age.
K.K., Appellant,
STATE of Utah, Appellee.
No. 950292-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 14, 1996.
Infant was determined to be neglected
child by the Third District Juvenile Court,
Salt Lake County, Olof A. Johansson, J.
Mother appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) after-born child
may be "neglected" based on abuse of siblings; (2) state established prima facie case
of neglect based on abuse of siblings; and (3)
challenge to state's use to judicial notice was
not preserved for appeal.
Affirmed.
Orme, P.J., concurred in part and concurred only in result in part.
1. Infants @=>156
For purposes of statute defining "neglected or abused child" as child who is at
risk of being neglected or abused because
another child in the same home was neglected or abused, children "in the same home" is
not limited to children actually present in
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D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627
Fax: (801)628-5225
JWH&Mc File No.: 3668.0004
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KUNZ & COMPANY dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a California
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
:

THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH :
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
:

Civil No. 94050322
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on before the Court on October 1, 1996, for a bench trial
pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was represented by counsel D.
Williams Ronnow. Defendants were represented by counsel Ralph L. Finlayson. The Court
received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The property in question, owned by Thomas Eveleth, located west of Interstate 15 in

the northernmost limits of the town of Toquerville, Washington County, was annexed by the Town
in 1992.

2.

Beginning in January 1993, Toquerville town undertook the process of master-

planning its entire community and enlisted the assistance of the Five County Association of Government1 s planner, the town engineer, and solicited the input of all property owners.
3.

The three signs in question in this lawsuit had been on the Eveleth property since

4.

The only use of the Eveleth property since 1987 has been for outdoor advertising

1987.

signage.
5.

There is no evidence of any utility ever servicing the property - water, power, gas,

sanitary sewer or other utilities.
6.

The Court finds from Exhibit 1 and testimony, the Town of Toquerville, is separated

into two distinct areas, one south of a high ridge that blocks the view of Anderson Junction from the
traditional "Main Street" area, and one north and west of the high ridge which constitutes the
annexed area and includes Anderson Junction and the 1-15 interchange.
7.

Unrebutted testimony was presented without objection that it was the purpose of the

Town in establishing its master plan, zoning ordinance, zoning districts and its zoning map, that
commercial zoning be limited to two distinct areas. One, a tiny parcel located at the south end of
the Town on state highway U-17 that leads toward LaVerkin, Utah, and the other parcel immediately
surrounding the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange in the north end of Toquerville.
8.

The Court finds from Exhibit 2, it was the intent of Toquerville Town, because it

incorporated its planning and zoning to match up with the existing zoning ordinance, that any
signage of the type involved in this litigation be permissible only by conditional use permit. The
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Town ordinance so provides, and it was the clear intention of the Town in this annexation to
substantially limit outdoor advertising signs by that process.
9.

The Court heard evidence and testimony of the intent of the Town from the former

mayor, the former chairman of the planning commission at the time these actions were undertaken,
and from the former town engineer, and while such testimony provides some assistance in the
Court's determination of these facts, the most telling evidence of Toquerville's intent with respect to
outdoor advertising signs is the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance itself.
10.

Due to the fact that the placement of outdoor advertising signs within the Eveleth

property after Toquerville annexed and zoned the subject property could only be done by conditional
use permit, the Court cannot find that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow outdoor
advertising signage.
11.

The primary purpose of Toquerville's zoning action, designating the subject property

as Highway Commercial, was to keep the commercial development away from the traditional
downtown Main Street area of Toquerville and isolate the traditional downtown area from the
property zoned commercial near the 1-15 Anderson Junction interchange and increase the tax revenue
of the town from an expanded commercial base.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The designation of the Highway Commercial zone at the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange
by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the primary purpose of
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allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate UCA § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988).
DATED this _3_ day of NoYcmbcrrl996.
BY THE

JAM£S L.
Fifth Distric
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the '*

day of November, 1996 to be hand-delivered and delivered via

facsimile to the following:
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Fax No.: 1-801-366-0352
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ADDENDUM E

FILED

'97 JRN 23 PH 1 23
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801)628-1627
Fax: (801) 628-5225
JWH&Mc File No.: 3668.0004

W A S ^ I ; ; - ^ - COUNTY
BY/O£_

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KUNZ & COMPANY dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a California
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
:
Civil No. 94050322

vs.

:

THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH :
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
:

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on before the Court on October 1, 1996, for a bench
trial pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was represented by
counsel D. Williams Ronnow. Defendants were represented by counsel Ralph L. Finlayson.

77P-

The Court having received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 4, 1996.
NOW, WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the designation of the Highway Commercial Zone at Anderson Junction 1-15
Interchange by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate Utah Code
Ann. § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988)
DATED this J? X^day of January, 1997.

JUDGEMENT ENTERED

Dsts:>29^7
Timo:
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

:ss.
)

Sharon M. Allhands, being first duly sworn, states that she is an employee of the law
firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, and that she caused to be served on this
c3-2- day of January, 1997, the foregoing proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT upon the

following by facsimile transmission and by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the
U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Fax No.: 1-801-366-0352

Sharon M. Allhands
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1997.
Nqfary Public
Residing at
^
"NOTA'kV VUBL1C
TAMMIE L. TAUCER
C24 North 1100 West
St George, Utah 84770
Mv Commission E* p ' fes
February 1D, "»**»
QTATE OF U T A H ,
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